Book Reveals Reasons Why U.S. Intelligence Has Failed
And Explains How it Should be Done!
Boye Lafayette De Mente
BOOK REVIEW:
Why U.S. Intelligence Fails to Steal Enemy Secrets – And What Can Be Done About It! – A Textbook on Espionage, by Len Walsh. Policy Institute, Lomita, CA, 2007, 356 p., $19.95.
TOKYO—Japan has had a long tradition of assassins and spies exemplified by the notorious ninja of the Shogun and samurai era and the success of its spy masters and spies leading up to and during World War II, so present-day practitioners of the arcane art of espionage will no doubt be interested in a new book by Len Walsh, a former resident of Japan.
Walsh’s book, Why U.S. Intelligence Fails to Steal Enemy Secrets – And What Can be Done About It, notes that the failures of U.S. Intelligence to steal enemy plans and intentions for U.S. policymakers are painfully public, with several books and articles describing the failures and ascribing the cause.
But only Walsh’s book documents that U.S. Intelligence failures are due solely to the CIA’s failure in espionage. In fact, no other book makes more than a passing reference to espionage at all.
TOKYO—Japan has had a long tradition of assassins and spies exemplified by the notorious ninja of the Shogun and samurai era and the success of its spy masters and spies leading up to and during World War II, so present-day practitioners of the arcane art of espionage will no doubt be interested in a new book by Len Walsh, a former resident of Japan.
Walsh’s book, Why U.S. Intelligence Fails to Steal Enemy Secrets – And What Can be Done About It, notes that the failures of U.S. Intelligence to steal enemy plans and intentions for U.S. policymakers are painfully public, with several books and articles describing the failures and ascribing the cause.
But only Walsh’s book documents that U.S. Intelligence failures are due solely to the CIA’s failure in espionage. In fact, no other book makes more than a passing reference to espionage at all.
A Textbook on Espionage, well-sourced with over 650 footnotes, lays out the theory and practice of espionage, with a detailed analysis of the finer points of espionage strategy and tactics, including the most important factor in finding and hiring a spy, the spy’s motivation. The book covers espionage in depth, including access, motivation, spotting, developing and recruiting of spies, tradecraft, running operations, maintaining security, and intelligence production.
Walsh says it is the CIA’s failure to understand the motivation of a spy (What would make a man in the enemy camp steal his organization’s secrets and give them to a CIA spymaster?) that is the single most important reason the CIA has no spies. To this day, CIA spymasters still claim they know how to recruit spies, even though their approach has not worked for the last 60 years.
He adds that only foreknowledge of the enemy’s plans and intentions can prevent surprise attacks on the United States. And only a spy in the enemy camp can provide that foreknowledge. Information on the enemy’s capabilities and activities, such as provided by satellite surveillance and electronic eavesdropping, and projections of future events, such as provided by estimative analysis, can tell much about what the enemy could do or might do, but nothing at all about what he will do. Only espionage can provide that.
This is what Sun Tzu meant 2,500 years ago when he wrote: “What is called foreknowledge cannot be elicited from spirits, nor from gods, nor by analogy with past events. It must be obtained from secret agents who know the enemy.”
A secret agent stealing enemy secrets is what espionage is all about. The charter for U.S. espionage is held by the CIA. The CIA is also charged with many tasks other than espionage, however. And it spends most of its time, budget and personnel on estimative analysis, covert action, liaison with foreign intelligence services, or trying to collect information from casual informants, to the neglect of espionage.
Based on interviews with over fifty spies and spymasters and on research in CIA documents and in the writings of current and former CIA officials, Walsh’s book uncovers the reason the CIA is unable to find and hire spies in the enemy camp. The CIA has only been successful in penetrating the enemy camp when a spy already in the camp walks in to the CIA and volunteers his services.
The first step in espionage is finding and hiring a spy. The second step is using professional tradecraft to manage the spy in a way that keeps him alive and well and stealing information for U.S. policymakers. CIA spymasters have no difficulty with the second step, and have been very successful in managing their walk-in volunteer spies. It is just the first step that consternates them.
The CIA was formed after World War II to collect and disseminate intelligence. But policymakers soon assigned the CIA two additional tasks, Covert Action (secret “war-fighting”) and Estimative Analysis (projection of future outcomes), and included these in a new definition of “intelligence.” (Most other countries kept their intelligence agencies just collecting facts. Russian Intelligence, for example, just went for the documents in their enemies’ safes. British Intelligence just collects the facts and sends them to the policy-making departments of the British Government who do the analysis.) Other tasks have also been given to the CIA over the years. Espionage seems to have been forgotten.
Covert Action and Estimative Analysis, as with satellite surveillance and electronic eavesdropping, are absolutely vital for national security, but they cannot provide foreknowledge of enemy plans and intentions. Only espionage, collecting information from a spy in the enemy camp, can give policymakers foreknowledge.
Hopefully, the CIA will change its approach and get back in the game.
AUTHOR CONTACT: lwalsh@socal.rr.com
